#Hearts of iron 4 how to naval invade full

#Hearts of iron 4 how to naval invade full

But should we? CanвЂ™t we get a bit more rational about this?вЂќ Douglas Lute | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document вЂњWe are a rich country and can pour money down a hole and it doesnвЂ™t bust the bank. вЂњOnce in a while, ok, we can overspend,вЂќ Douglas Lute | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document Douglas Lute, an Army lieutenant general who served as the White HouseвЂ™s Afghan war czar from 2007 to 2013, told government interviewers.

Troubles plaguing many reconstruction programs in Afghanistan have been well documented, but the interview records obtained by The Washington Post contain new narratives from insiders on what went wrong. I donвЂ™t have any confidence that if we did it again, we would do any better.вЂќ Stephen Hadley | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document вЂњEvery time we have one of these things, it is a pickup game. вЂњWe just donвЂ™t have a post-conflict stabilization model that works,вЂќ Stephen Hadley | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document Stephen Hadley, who served as White House national security adviser under Bush, told government interviewers. track record of military interventions in other countries - Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Haiti, Somalia - over the past quarter-century. Much of the money, they said, ended up in the pockets of overpriced contractors or corrupt Afghan officials, while U.S.-financed schools, clinics and roads fell into disrepair, if they were built at all. Many said the overall nation-building strategy was further undermined by hubris, impatience, ignorance and a belief that money can fix anything. вЂњWe spent so much money and there is so little to show for it.вЂќ Michael Callen | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full documentД¬allen and others blamed an array of mistakes committed again and again over 18 years - haphazard planning, misguided policies, bureaucratic feuding. вЂњI mean, the writing is on the wall now,вЂќ Michael Callen | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document Michael Callen, an economist with the University of California at San Diego specializing on the Afghan public sector, told government interviewers. nation-building project backfired in so many other ways that even foreign-aid advocates questioned whether Afghanistan, in the abstract, might have been better off without any U.S. The size of the Afghan economy has nearly quintupled.Д«ut the U.S. The number of children in school has soared. (Paula Bronstein/Getty Images)Д«y some measures, life in Afghanistan has improved markedly since 2001. (Emilio Morenatti/AP) AfghanistanвЂ™s first class of female army officers graduates in Kabul in 2010. workers unload ballots before the October 2004 presidential election. Girls from the northeastern village of Ghumaipayan Mahnow watch U.N. troops in the war zone to 100,000.ДЄfghanistanвЂ™s first class of female army officers graduates in Kabul in 2010. The flood crested during ObamaвЂ™s first term as president, as he escalated the number of U.S. Then, they said, Congress and the White House made matters worse by drenching the destitute country with far more money than it could possibly absorb. Speaking candidly on the assumption that most of their remarks would not be made public, those interviewed said Washington foolishly tried to reinvent Afghanistan in its own image by imposing a centralized democracy and a free-market economy on an ancient, tribal society that was unsuited for either. officials have said it will need billions more dollars in aid annually, for decades.

Instead of bringing stability and peace, they said, the United States inadvertently built a corrupt, dysfunctional Afghan government that remains dependent on U.S.

Responses to The Post from people named in The Afghanistan Papers Part 4: Consumed by corruption How the United States allowed graft and thievery to thrive. See the documents More than 2,000 pages of interviews and memos reveal a secret history of the war.